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Drawing on recent developments in virology and the work of 
Chicana queer-feminist Gloria Anzaldúa, 
this article explores the possibility of shifting from anthropo-
centric epistemologies (including feminist standpoint theo-
ries) into more expansive, decentralized modes of knowledge 
production which are neither entirely human-centered nor 
fully post-human. We explore this shift through several parts: 
(1) A brief overview of recent critiques of anthropocentrism 
and the limitations in mainstream feminist standpoint 
theory’s ability to overcome this anthropocentrism; 
(2) an exploration of recent developments in virology’s prom-
ising alternatives to anthropocentrism’s narrow definition 
of the human; and (3) an analysis of Anzaldúa’s innovative 
nepantlera subjectivity and onto-epistemology as seen in her 
theory of conocimiento. Because scholars have yet 
to examine the post-anthropocentric (and posthumanist) 
dimensions of Anzaldúa’s thought, but instead generally 
categorize her epistemology as an ethnic-specific feminist 
standpoint theory, her work offers a unique point of entry 
into these investigations.
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“In its arrogant, alienated, and domineering Western form, human identity 
reflects a host of problematic assumptions, biases, prejudices, and myths derived 
from religion, philosophy, science, and culture as a whole. The massive, 
tangled knot of ideologies involved in the social construction of our species 
identity need to be critically unraveled, so that we can develop new identities 
and societies and forge sane, ethical, ecological, and sustainable life ways.”
Steven Best1
It is by now almost a commonplace among theorists in new 
materialism, critical animal studies, and other recent fields to critique 
anthropocentrism (defined here as the centring of human beings 
and human beings’ concerns). Generally, the argument goes something 
like this: Our Westernised self, social identity, and epistemology are 
deeply entrenched within worldviews that marginalize nonhuman beings 
and things while centring the human as distinct, detached, and domi-
nant, the magnum opus of divine being or evolution. Anthropocentrism’s 
cognitive framework situates humankind as intrinsically apart from 
and quintessentially above the inhuman rabble—as not a system but 
a sovereignty complete and self-contained, as a be-all and end-all, 
as the alpha and the omega, separate from and superior to rats, rocks, 
ferns, fungi, and firestorms, to dirt, dogs, ice glaciers, influenza, 
and beyond. To paraphrase the words of Steven Best featured in our 
epigraph, if it’s not human, it doesn’t count, and this anthropocentric way 
of being, believing, and behaving imbues and influences the human code 
of inter-human and planetary conduct. Neither sound nor sustainable, 
our human-social and environmental ideologies and practices are not 
ethical, not equitable, and cannot endure.2
While we do not presume a simplistic causal relationship between 
anthropocentrism and the myriad crises impacting our planet, we believe 
that its narrow humanism and restrictive definitions of the human 
have played significant roles in shaping these crises. We need new 
definitions of the human, new subjectivities, and new epistemologies. 
In short, we need new worldviews. Rosi Braidotti makes a similar point: 
“[W]e need to devise new social, ethical, and discursive schemes of subject 
1  S. Best, Minding the Animals: Ethology and the Obsolescence of Left Human-
ism, „The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy”, 5 February 2009.
2  This point is argued by many scholars. See, for instance, E. Hayward, 
More Lessons from a Starfish: Prefixial Flesh and Transspeciated Selves, „Women’s 
Studies Quarterly” 2008, no. 3–4, p. 64–85; I. Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology 
of the Relationships between Humans and Things, Hoboken 2012.
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formation to match the profound transformations we are undergoing. 
That means we need to learn to think differently about ourselves[,] 
... to think critically and creatively about who and what we are actually 
becoming.”3 Like Braidotti, we call for the development of “alterna-
tive schemes of thought, knowledge, and self-representation”4. And so, 
in this article, we explore the possibilities of shifting from anthropocen-
trism into less centralized, more expansive and interconnected worldviews 
in which the human is neither exceptionalized nor excluded. Drawing on 
recent work in science studies, U.S. women-of-colour theories, and specu- 
lative realisms, our article investigates this shift through several parts: 
(1) A brief overview of recent critiques of anthropocentrism and the limita- 
tions in mainstream feminist standpoint theory’s ability to overcome this 
anthropocentrism; (2) an exploration of recent developments in viro- 
logy’s promising alternatives to anthropocentrism’s narrow definition 
of the human; and (3) an analysis of Chicana queer-feminist theorist 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s innovative nepantlera subjectivity and onto-episte-
mology as seen in her theory of conocimiento.5 Because scholars have 
yet to examine the post-anthropocentric (and posthumanist) dimensions 
of Anzaldúa’s thought but instead generally categorize her epistemology 
as an ethnic-specific feminist standpoint theory, her work offers a unique 
point of entry into these investigations. We conclude with a few specu- 
lative questions about what the virus and conocimiento might teach 
us as we attempt to develop post-anthropocentric epistemologies 
and definitions of the human. 
Like other critical posthumanist scholars influenced by feminism, 
environmentalism, and other recent theoretical movements, we call 
for and attempt to develop a post-anthropocentric worldview. Rather 
than entirely reject the human by positing some type of post-human 
figure, we enact a critical posthumanism that proceeds by redefining 
the human in more expansive terms that underscore human beings’ 
radical interconnectedness with all existence yet, simultaneously, decenter 
3  R. Braidotti, The Posthuman, Cambridge, UK 2013, p. 12.
4  Ibid., p. 12.
5  We borrow the term “onto-epistemology” from Karen Barad and use it to 
underscore Anzaldúa’s innovative inter-twining of epistemology and ontology—
an intertwining which precedes Barad’s work by years. See Barad’s „Matter feels, 
converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers.” New Materialisms: Interviews 
and Cartographies, ed. R. Dolphijn, I. van der Tuin, London 2012.We discuss 
nepantlera subjectivity and conocimiento in detail below. In brief, “nepantlera” 
is a term Anzaldúa coined to describe a liminal, threshold person or mediator 
among multiple worlds; and “conocimiento” is her term for her onto-epistemology.
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the human. (Through this decentring process, we avoid both a “humanism 
that excludes nonhuman suffering and labour” and a transhumanism 
that strives for an “enhanced” human being.)6
As a number of contemporary scholars have argued, anthropocen-
trism’s characteristic centring and superiorising of the human being 
and agenda not only authorize the domination, destruction, exploita-
tion, control, and rampant consumption of beings and things relegated 
as not-human, but also construct a solitary human subjectivity, isolate 
the human in an illusion of sequestration, and create a cognitive disso-
nance that prevents human beings from recognising our connection 
to the Earth and acknowledging that the harm humankind does to 
the Earth must, necessarily, harm humanity as well. Michael Meacher, 
former environmental minister to the UK, explains that while five 
times previously the Earth has been subject to massive extinctions, we 
are experiencing now and for the first time ever a planetary cataclysm 
initiated by an Earthen species. Meacher cites the human-engineered 
shortages of fresh water, the human demolition of forest and land, 
the escalating devastation by human-manufactured climate change, 
the human overuse and exploitation of the Earth’s natural resources, 
and the relentless rise in human population as driving the “elasticities 
of the world’s ecosystems beyond their tolerance limits.”As Meacher states, 
“[w]hat we now face is a transformation of our world and its ecosystems 
at an exponential rate, and unprecedentedly brought about not by natural 
forces, but by the activities of the dominant species across the planet.”7
Epistemologically supporting this conceptual severing of human-
kind from nonhuman entities is a dichotomous mode of discernment 
through which beings, things, conditions, and concepts are defined by 
their construed disparity. Difference within this epistemic framework 
is not a neutral equation but instead a formula conveying not only 
categorical polarity but also rigid demarcation as superior/inferior. 
Manifesting anthropocentrically and exemplified in pairings such as 
human/animal and human/nature wherein the human is detached from 
and dominant over nonhuman animals, and “nature” is conceptualized as 
obtaining meaning and value only through the control, commodification, 
and so-called civilizing influence of human rule, this dichotomous 
framework leads to hierarchical segregation: the further a being or thing 
6  For discussions of these critical posthumanisms, see R. Braidotti The Posthu-
man, especially chapter two and R. Twine, Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanisms, 
„The Sociological Review” 2010, no. 58.S1, p. 175–195. The quotation is on p. 179.
7  M. Meacher, End of the World Nigh: It’s Official, lecture delivered 
at Newcastle University, 14 February 2003 (Global Policy Forum).
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falls from the anthropocentrically defined “human,” the more alien 
and thereby inferior this being or thing becomes. Anthropocentrism’s 
cognitive censorship positions these constitutive others fundamentally 
outside human reference, thus suppressing any possibility of human-
nonhuman connection. The binary ways of thinking, the relentless, 
recurring dynamics of dominance/oppression, power/powerlessness, 
I/other are all rooted within anthropocentrism. Mountains, monera, 
manatee, mushrooms, tomatoes, tornados, turtles, the tundra, apes, 
aluminium, and amoebas are the alien, the other, the lesser—their worth 
determined by their potential for human consumption. 
Anthropocentrism’s single-dimensional narrative leaves no space for 
interdependency, collectivity, communion, or symbiosis. Formally estab-
lished by Socrates in early fourth century BCE, this anthropocentric 
standpoint resounds through western philosophy’s tenets and continues 
to permeate and frame contemporary ideologies. Despite notable 
exceptions (Homer, Hesiod, Theophrastus, Pythagoras, Empedocles, 
and Spinoza), western canonical philosophers like Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, Descartes, Heidegger, and Kant have directed considerable effort to 
conclusively demonstrate the indelible distinction between the human and 
the nonhuman. As Gary Steiner explains in Anthropocentrism and Its 
Discontents, western philosophy’s “dominant view ... is that human beings 
are fundamentally superior to nonhuman animals, typically on the grounds 
that only human beings possess reason, language, and self-awareness”.8 And 
although the majority of western philosophers ponder the anthropocentri-
cally-defined “moral status” of nonhuman animals—and ultimately deny 
not only moral status to nonhuman animals but also assert that humankind 
has absolutely no moral obligations towards nonhuman animals—they give 
no such consideration to entities dualistically divided from and hierarchically 
ranked further below the inferiorised category of the nonhuman animal: 
the nonanimal things, objects, and systems of the Earth.9
An increasing number of contemporary theorists argue that anthro-
pocentrism is both factually false and ideologically flawed, and that 
8  G. Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Ani-
mals in the History of Western Philosophy, Pittsburgh 2010, p. 38.
9  See for example B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. C. Porter, 
Cambridge 1993; R. Braidotti, The Postmodern; M.J. Hird, Feminist Engagements 
with Matter, „Feminist Studies” 2009, no. 2, p. 329–346; M.J. Hird, C. Roberts, 
Feminism Theorises the Nonhuman, „Feminist Theory” 2011, no. 2, p. 109–117; 
N. Giffney, M.J. Hird, Introduction: Queering the Non/Human, Theorising the Non/
Human, Burlington, VT 2008; C. Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, 
and the Scientific Revolution, New York 1983.
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the ramifications of this fallacy are not trivial but instead cataclysmic. As John 
Burnside asserts, “anthropocentrism underpins our most basic moral and political 
failures . . . as long as we are even the least bit anthropocentric, we do harm, not 
only to other creatures and their habitats but to the world we ourselves inhabit.”10 
Right now, in this very moment, acting with anthropocentrically-conferred 
authority and arrogance, humankind hurts the planet, hurts the beings and things 
collectively comprising the planet, and has the escalating ability to conclusively 
destroy the planet.11
Yet as feminist standpoint theorists (among others) remind us, all too 
often this anthropocentricism is even more narrow than our analysis 
would imply because “humankind” has itself been defined in restrictive 
terms that include only some human beings: those from elite groups who 
have, historically, shaped anthropocentric thought in their own image. 
By exposing this nonobjective, narrow (androcentric) worldview, feminist 
standpoint theorists have significantly expanded our understanding of 
anthropocentrism’s deadly limitations.12 And yet, despite their important 
critiques of conventional (anthropocentric) philosophies and theories, 
feminist standpoint theories—like the mainstream Western perspec-
tives they critique—centre the human, enacting versions of what Greta 
Gaard describes as “human-centred (anthropocentric) feminism.”13 
In short, feminist standpoint theory itself inadvertently adheres 
to the precepts and paradigm of anthropocentrism, while only somewhat 
expanding the epistemology to include previously overlooked groups 
10  J. Burnside, Humans Don’t Make the World Go ‘Round, „New Statesman”, 
29 November 2012.
11  Early in the 1980s, biologist Eugene F. Stoermer coined the term 
“the Anthropocene” to convey a geological epoch within which the present and 
potential impact of humankind upon the planet poses a conclusively catastrophic 
risk. We live in the Anthropocene, and the magnitude of humankind’s harmful 
influence upon the earth and the likelihood of planetary destruction increase each day.
12  Although she stops too soon, Sandra Harding offers a nuanced critique of 
this anthropocentric exceptionalism in Sciences from Below: Feminisms, Postcoloni-
alities, and Modernities, Durham 2008. 
See Ralph Acampora’s discussion of Marilyn Frye’s work in Zoos and Eyes: 
Contesting Captivity and Seeking Successor Practices, „Society and Animals” 2005, 
no. 1, p. 69–88. As Acampora notes, “Frye speaks of arrogant eyes which organize 
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests” (p. 67); she 
has in mind the controlling gaze of patriarchy and its effects on women, but her 
analysis in several respects is quite capable of extrapolation to the gaze of anthro-
pocentrism and its effects on nonhuman animals” (p. 85).
13  G. Gaard, Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting Essentialism and Re-Placing Species 
in a Material Feminist Environmentalism, „Feminist Formations” 2011, no. 2, p. 26–53. 
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of humans.14 To be sure, conventional feminist standpoint theory has 
made significant contributions to academic social-justice movements,15 
and our point here is not to condemn or reject it. Demonstrating 
knowledge production as intrinsically informed by embodied social 
location, feminist standpoint epistemologies have offered vital critiques of 
Enlightenment-based assumptions about absolute truths and mono-
lithic worldviews. In this article, we build on these critiques while 
borrowing from feminist standpoint theory’s method, its ability to retell 
a totalistic narrative, shifting human paradigm and perspective to a less 
centralised, more interconnected viewpoint.
Anthropocentrism does not serve us well. We need new worldviews 
that de-centre the human. In the following pages, we speculate on 
several routes we could take to enact this de-centring process. Because 
anthropocentrism is based upon an onto-epistemology that posits and 
enacts an unbreachable schism between humankind and the beings 
and things categorically jumbled as not-human, one possible approach 
entails dismantling the notion of the human body as a locus of biological 
integrity. Deconstructing anthropocentrism’s flat-earth fallacy with 
emerging scientific data enables us to reconceptualise the human “I” 
in collective terms—a “We” comprised of monera, protista, fungi, 
plantae, animalia, and viruses. As Jane Bennett describes in Vibrant 
Matter, the simple crook of the human elbow is “a bountiful home to 
no fewer than six tribes of bacteria,” and rather than see the human 
as singularly embodied, it is necessary to know that “[w]e are, rather, 
an array of bodies, many different kinds of them”16. These nonhuman 
assemblages literally constitute the human body, and investigating their 
direct contributions to human physiology can derail anthropocentrism’s 
story of the human as singular in subject, identity, and agency. 
It is biologically accurate to characterise the human not as a sepa-
rate, organically segregated body and being but rather as a microbiome 
—a neologism Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg coined in 2000 
14  Hence Braidotti’s description of feminist standpoint theory as “human-
ist feminism,” in Feminist Epistemology after Postmodernism: Critiquing Science, 
Technology and Globalisation, “Interdisciplinary Science Reviews” 2007, no. 1. For 
an example of feminist standpoint epistemologies’ anthropocentrism, see Hard-
ing’s Sciences from Below.
15  For a representative sampling of conventional feminist standpoint theory, 
see Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock, Susan Hekman, and Patricia Hill Collins. 
For samples of their work, see The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, ed. S. Harding, 
New York 2003.
16  J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham 2010, p. 112–113.
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to reference the sum of microbial species, the genomes of these species, 
and the mutual interaction occurring on and in the human environment. 
The commonly conceptualised singular human body and/or being is in 
fact an inter-special, multi-corporeal conglomerate.17 We are, as Dorion 
Sagan notes, “beings made of beings;” derived “messily from a motley;” 
“crisscrossed and cohabited by strange beings, intimate visitors who 
affect our behavior.”18 While previous scientific epistemologies have 
framed the flora, the fauna, the nonhuman entities present on and in 
the human body as the they—the foreign matter serving or injuring 
the distinct and apex us—contemporary microbiomic research refutes 
this binary notion, reveals that the they are in truth also the us.
To be “human” is to be predominantly “not human”—a vigourously 
dynamic, mostly cooperative but sometimes combative, busy crowd 
of interbeing. “Being human” is to be 100 trillion—nearly an entire 
kilogram!—of assorted bacteria; it is to be an abounding multitude of 
mites and monera, a frenzy of fungi and microflora. The human gut, 
for example, is a veritable galaxy of microorganisms, and the human belly 
button brims with unique, industrious beings. These interacting enti-
ties’ communal conduct does not just contribute to but instead creates 
the physiology that we call “human.” When we recognize the human 
body and being as a collaborative effort, the processes and phenomena 
of being human is seen in every micro-moment of our lives as influ-
enced both hugely and minutely, both benevolently and malignantly, 
by the legion of beings and things constituting the human.19 Endeavouring 
to decentre the human and deconstruct the concept of the human body 
and being as exclusive and excluded, alone and unaligned with an otherised 
and therefore subordinate world, we focus on what Jane Bennett terms 
the “its”—the “I as it: the outside that’s within.”20 Donna Haraway, charting 
the intersection of science and philosophy, notes in When Species Meet that 
exclusively human genomes constitute only ten percent of the human body; 
17  See, for elucidation, the National Institute of Health’s Human Microbi-
ome Project.
18  D. Sagan, Cosmic Apprentice: Dispatches from the Edges of Science, 
Minneapolis 2013.
19  In Vibrant Matter Bennett writes of the “‘alien’ quality of our own flesh,” 
the ways through which human “flesh is populated and constituted by different 
swarms of foreigners” (J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, 
Durham 2010, p. 112), and describes the human difficulty in focusing upon 
“the oxymoronic truism that the human is not exclusively human, that we are made 
up of its” (p. 113). 
20  J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 113–114.
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the other ninety percent of so-called human cells contain the genomes of 
“bacteria, fungi, protists, and such.”An individual is never alone but rather 
becomes “an adult human being in company with these tiny messmates.”21 
Or, as Bennett asserts, “we are also nonhuman,” explaining that “human 
being and thinghood overlap ... the us and the it slip-slide into each other.”22 
In presenting the human body and being as not precisely human but more 
accurately a conglomeration, it is both productive and provocative to 
feature the virus—an entity on the cusp of conceptualised life, transgressing 
scientific classifications of “living” and “dead,” confounding the being/
thing binary, and companioning the human as an often maligned member 
of the microbiome since the proverbial dawn of time.
What new epistemologies can arise through considering the organic 
state of interconnection characterising the viral-human relationship? 
What conceptual shifts, what new perceptions, become possible 
when we recognize the collaboration, the alliance, the relationship 
of reciprocal transformation quintessential to the host-virus relationship? 
What massive evolution in self-schema accompanies the realization 
that we humans are not individual, independent, self-propelled and 
self-empowered but rather a legion, a numberless multitude, a vibrant 
throng of interdependencies, our every moment, every move, every 
mood not the act of “I,” “I,” “I,” but rather the act of a “We” too alien 
to fully comprehend or comfortably contemplate? 
Within contemporary fields of science and medicine, the virus is 
no longer seen single-dimensionally as disease, but rather increasingly 
assayed—albeit through an anthropocentric lens—as both human 
biological appurtenance and facilitative adjunct to human evolution. 
Viruses are old. It’s only barely hyperbolic to say that they have been 
around forever. A non-cellular entity, not quite scientifically acknow-
ledged as “alive,” scientists posit that viruses emerged at or close 
to the origin of life, 3.5 billion years ago.23 Viruses are endemic 
to the planet, endemic to all forms of conceptual life; as Dennis H. Bamford 
explains, cellular-based beings (i.e., humans) are vastly outnumbered 
by viral entities: “cellular life can be conceptualized as ‘bathing 
in a virtual sea of viruses.”24
21  D. Haraway, When Species Meet, Minneapolis 2007, p. 3.
22  J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 4.
23  H.W. Ackermann, Bacteriophage Observations and Evolution, „Research 
in Microbiology” 2003, no. 4, p. 245–251.
24  D.H.Bamford, Do Viruses Form Lineages across Different Domains of Life?, 
„Research in Microbiology” 2003, no. 4, p. 231–236.
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Disproven conclusively by biology, the anthropocentric narrative of 
humankind’s discrete preeminence is false; the viral sea in which we bathe 
is not a foreign realm but a familiar habitat, a familial home. Microbial 
biology has made recent, extremely relevant, and fascinating discove-ries 
regarding the interspecial relationship between viruses and other life 
forms, hypothesising that viruses have not only coevolved with other 
species but also directly contributed to—indeed created!—these species’ 
bodies. Virologist George Rice explains that viruses “make up the largest 
component of biomass on this planet,” adding that when “considering 
that not only is viral presence on this planet all encompassing, but every 
sequenced organism to date has a major component of its genome that 
is viral in origin, it becomes apparent that viruses are integral players 
in the evolution of what we presently consider life.”25 Humans and 
viruses share common ancestry; as Bamford explains, “[t]aken together 
with the observation that cellular life is intimately linked with the world 
of viruses, and possibly always has been, it seems that viruses may form 
lineages that extend from the root to all branches in the tree of life” 
(p. 234). Carl Zimmer applies this model directly to the human species, 
stating that “[v]iruses have insinuated themselves into the genome of 
our ancestors for hundreds of millions of years... inserting their own 
DNA into ours.”26 Anthropocentrism shrinks the world, denying 
the biological reality of our human past as well as present and pruning 
the branches in the tree of life to a human-centred perspective, but simple 
biological fact refutes this notion, conclusively dispels the conceit of 
the canonically centred and segregated human body and being.
Confounding the anthropocentric conceptualisation of the human 
and the virus existing in diametric distinction as well as combative 
opposition, biologist Frank Ryan writes in his article “I, Virus: Why You’re 
Only Half Human” that nearly half of human DNA is comprised of viral 
components. With anthropocentrically typical human hubris, scientists 
relegated these nonhuman viral components as “junk DNA” and only 
very recently acknowledged their crucial role in human biology. Indeed, 
as Ryan notes, overwhelming evidence demonstrates that “viruses have signifi- 
cantly changed human evolution,” making the human genome a human-
nonhuman assemblage, the evolutionary “union of vertebrate and virus.”27
25  G. Rice, Are Viruses Alive? Microbial Life – Educational Resources, Montana 
State University, n.d.
26  C. Zimmer, Mammals Made By Viruses, „Discover Magazine” 14 February 2012.
27  F. Ryan, I, Virus: Why You’re Only Half Human, „Science and Technology” 
29 January 2010.
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The results of this union between the human and the virus have 
literally changed the course of evolution for us both. And yet how 
did the human genome become infused not only with so many and 
myriad viral components, but also with genes that are literally viral 
and human prodigy? Symbiogenesis is the forming of a single new 
entity through the merging of two unique entities, and throughout our 
primordial past and into our present, viral DNA has combined with 
human DNA to create hybridically new organisms. Communion between 
virus and human is contagion, and ancient contagion became connubial 
co-evolution. Take, for example, the serendipitous prehistoric instance in 
which our human ancestor was infected by a very avid, ambitious virus. 
Viral and human DNA merged to develop a specific gene encoded with 
the ability to form the protein syncytin. Syncytin enabled the virus 
to fuse together the cells of the human host in order to facilitate viral 
mobility, and the human host made use of syncytin in building a placenta 
fusing foetus to mother, ensuring the passage of nutrients in utero from 
mother to foetus, and protecting the foetus from attack by the immune 
system of the mother. Had this primaeval infection—this viral/human 
relationship of mutual change, mutual evolution—never occurred, 
the human would not give live birth to young but would instead lay 
eggs as do birds, and many fish, reptiles and amphibians.28
Our human genome is crowded with the record of every instance 
in which we were touched indelibly by virus. Like an organic hard drive, 
we are inscribed with the chemical code of conjugal contact between human 
and virus, and this record stretches back a hundred million years. Only 
a fraction of our “human” genes code for actual human life; the rest 
of our genome is comprised of what we would anthropocentrically construe 
as alien, as other, as not an “Us” but rather an “It”—or even worse from 
an anthropocentric perspective, as a horrific hybrid of the sacrosanct, 
purportedly inviolate human, and the alien, the other, the It. 
This notion of the human as not a purely human being but instead 
a genetic mongrel has no place within anthropocentrism’s binary frame-
work. Viewed from this oppositional perspective, the virus’s contact with 
the human is “infection;” the virus is a parasite attacking, infiltrating, 
sabotaging, and destroying the human host. Virus and human are 
disparate and combative, each maintaining—even and especially through 
28  See C. Esnault, G. Cornelis, O. Heidmann, T. Heidmann, Differential 
Evolutionary Fate of an Ancestral Primate Endogenous Retrovirus Envelope Gene, the EnvV 
Syncytin, Captured for a Function in Placentation, „Plos Genetics”, C. Zimmer, A Planet 
of Viruses, Chicago 2011, G. Magiorkinis, R.J. Gifford, A. Katzourakis, J. De Ranter, 
R. Belshaw, Env-Less Endogenous Retroviruses Are Genomic Superspreaders.
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contact—distinct and rigidly delineated identities. But this dichoto-
mous doctrine is a fallacy. Infection is not invasion but infusion of viral 
and human selves. Contagion is biological communion, not combat. 
This human-virus liaison changes both human and virus, and throughout 
the ages our species have companioned each other as consorts in 
an interrelationship of mutual transformation.
Without the virus, humanity as we know it would not exist, and without 
the human, the virus would not exist in its present forms. Focusing upon 
this nondichotomous virus-human relationship decentres the human 
and deconstructs anthropocentric descriptions of the human body as 
an élite, exclusive, and lonely independency. An onto-epistemological 
change begun microscopically has macrocosmic potential; revising 
anthropocentrism’s mythos at the microbiomic level can catalyze 
a shift in humankind’s ways of knowing, being, and acting which not only 
releases humankind from the seclusion of construed supremacy, but also 
invites humanity to recognise (and hopefully address) rampant planetary 
consumption this mythoshas encouraged us to enact. 
What implications arise, when we acknowledge that the human 
body and being is not singular and solitary but instead comprised of 
a plurality of entities? What could it mean to realise that we are not 
human but rather a virus-human hybrid? To understand that the virus, 
too, is not an entity existing in exclusivity and alienated independence 
but rather in a biological fusion, an organic give-and-take with human-
kind? Through the alchemy of association, both virus and human host 
are transformed—transformed in the instant of contact, and potentially, 
evolutionarily transformed for eons to come. 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s groundbreaking work offers further insight into 
this decentring process. Although Anzaldúa has often been used to 
illustrate feminist standpoint epistemologies,29 we believe that these 
illustrations focus too closely on one aspect of Anzaldúa’s work and thus 
overlook her expansive concept of personhood, as well as the possibili-
ties that can arise through her radically redefined standpoints. As we 
explain in the following pages, Anzaldúa develops a post-anthropocentric 
subjectivity and onto-epistemology which neither erase nor elevate 
the human but instead radically blur the boundaries between conven-
tional (Cartesian) definitions of human and nonhuman life. Thus, for 
29  See for instance T.A. Martine, Making Oppositional Culture, Making 
Standpoint: A Journey into Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands, „Sociological Spectrum” 
2005, no. 5, p. 539–570; and Harding’s footnoted references to Anzaldúa, as well 
as her chapter titled “Borderland Epistemologies,” in Is Science Multicultural? 
Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies, Bloomington, IN 1998.
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example, in a 1977 poem titled “The coming of el mundo surdo,” she 
defines herself in broad terms that include but go beyond typical represen- 
tations of the human: “Within my skin all races / sexes all trees grasses / 
cows and snails.”30 Analogous to the viral-human relationship described 
above, Anzaldúa defines the human in language that acknowledges social 
identity categories (referring to “all races / sexes”) yet exceeds the human 
(body) to embrace non-animal plant life, as well as nonhuman animals. 
While scholars and other readers generally describe Anzaldúa 
according to specific social identities (“Chicana,” “lesbian,” “queer,” “femi-
nist,” “campesino,” “disabled,” and/or “working-class”), Anzaldúa herself prac-
ticed a more fluid self-naming process. Throughout her career, she generally 
defined herself in much larger terms—terms which begin with specific 
human identity categories but go beyond them without erasing or 
ignoring the categories themselves. In short, she transforms—without 
rejecting or denying—the human-based social identities which feminist 
standpoint theories emerge from and valorise. Thus, for example, in her 
early autohistoria, “La Prieta,” she positions herself with/in an array 
of oppositional movements:
I am a wind-swayed bridge, a crossroads inhabited by whirlwinds. Gloria, 
the facilitator, Gloria, the mediator, straddling the walls between abysses. “Your 
allegiance is to La Raza, the Chicano movement,” say the members of my race. 
“Your allegiance is to the Third World,” say my Black and Asian friends. “Your 
allegiance is to your gender, to women,” say the feminists. Then there’s my 
allegiance to the Gay movement, to the socialist revolution, to the New Age, 
to magic and the occult. And there’s my affinity to literature, to the world 
of the artist. What am I? A third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic 
leanings. They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with 
a label.31
While each group demands that she self-identify and align her activism 
entirely within their parameters, Anzaldúa resists these expectations 
without rejecting the people or dis-respecting their political aspirations 
for a more equitable world. After noting the potential divisiveness 
in their demands, she embraces the contradiction:
30  G. Anzaldúa, The Coming of el Mundo Surdo, in: The Gloria Anzaldúa 
Reader, ed. A. Keating, Durham 2009, spacing in the original. We highlight 
the early date of this poem, as well as several other Anzaldúan texts, in order to 
underscore the extent of Anzaldúa’s posthumanism.
31  La Prieta, in: This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women 
of Color, 1981, ed. Ch. Moraga, G. Anzaldúa, New York 1983, p. 198–209.
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You say my name is ambivalence? Think of me as Shiva, a many-armed and 
-legged body with one foot on brown soil, one on white, one in straight society, 
one in the gay world, the man’s world, the women’s, one limb in the lite-
rary world, another in the working class, the socialist, and the occult worlds. 
A sort of spider woman hanging by one thin strand of web.
 Who, me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me. 
Anzaldúa maintained this inclusionary stance despite the fact that, 
during the time of this essay (1979-1981), separatism, nationalism, and 
identity-based alliances were almost the norm among many U.S. femi-
nists, ethnic nationalists, and other progressive social actors. Although 
she experienced intense pressure to conform, she refused to do so. 
By shifting her focus from these demands to the stories and desires which 
triggered and shaped them, she exposes the social labels’ limitations and 
the flaws in the various forms of identity policing (and “group think”) 
on which such labels rely. This outward-directed shift enables Anzaldúa 
to redefine belonging in more inclusionary terms. She creates alternative 
communities that respect–but are not based on–social identity categories.
Anzaldúa’s mobile self-positioning and inclusionary alliances illus-
trate what we describe as her nepantlera subjectivity—an approach to 
human identity which facilitates the shift from anthropocentrism into 
a more generous, less human-centred worldview. As we define the term, 
nepantlera subjectivity represents a nonanthropocentric understanding 
of personhood that decentres, but does not deny, the human. As such, 
it offers a useful alternative to feminist standpoint epistemologies while 
avoiding both anthropocentrism’s binary-oppositional frameworks and 
the premature eradication of the human found in some versions of 
posthumanist thought. We borrow the word “nepantlera” from Anzaldúa, 
who coined it to describe her own experiences and those of other liminal, 
threshold people who refuse to belong only to one community but 
instead negotiate within and among them (analogous to Anzaldúa’s 
movements, discussed above, in “La Prieta”). Nepantleras are mediators 
who move among multiple worlds, employ relational epistemologies, 
develop inclusionary communities, and facilitate additional types of 
transformation. As Anzaldúa explains in “Speaking across the Divides”:
Nepantleras are the supreme border crossers. They act as intermediaries 
between cultures and their various versions of reality. Las nepantleras, like 
the ancient chamanas, move between the worlds. They can work from multiple 
locations, can circumvent polarizing binaries. They try not to get locked into one 
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perspective or perception of things. They can see through our cultural condi-
tioning and through our respective cultures’ toxic ways of life. They try to 
overturn the destructive perceptions of the world that we’ve been taught by our 
various cultures. They change the stories about who we are and about our 
behavior. . . . Nepantleras think in terms of the planet, not just their own racial group, 
the U.S., or Norte América.32
Nepantlera subjectivity is multiplicitous, post-anthropocentric, 
and nonbinary. Nepantleras do not base their self-definitions, percep-
tions, or politics on the experiences of a specific (sometimes monoli-
thic) group–or even the experiences of all human beings; they strive 
to adopt relational, planetary perspectives that embrace internal and 
external collectivity. With this shifting multiplicity, nepantlera subjec-
tivity facilitates paradigmatic border crossings and transitions between 
cognitive frameworks. Through nepantlera subjectivity, the limitations 
of ideologies grounded in anthropocentrism may be perceived, and 
this perception may help us to move in theory and praxis beyond 
the constrained cartography of a conceptual human centre. 
Internally, nepantlera subjectivity requires a complex, nonunitary 
definition of the human. Look, for instance, at Anzaldúa’s description of 
“the human personality” in a 1991 interview with AnaLouise Keating:
It’s supposed to be one. You know, you’re one entity--one person with one 
identity. But that’s not so. There are many personalities and subpersonalities 
in you and your identity shifts every time you shift positions.33
Unlike anthropocentrism’s fixed “I,” which posits and relies on 
a rigid boundary between human and nonhuman, Anzaldúa’s nepan-
tlera subjectivity contains an internal multiplicity, a divergent selfhood 
that welcomes and expects alterations. This multiplicity is fully enfle-
shed, making the body itself multiple–a thriving, teeming community 
composed of millions and millions of nonhuman entities. Anzaldúa 
celebrates this internal multiplicity in an unpublished short story, called 
“La entrada de ajenos a la casa/The Entry of the alien into the house.” 
As she explains in the same interview, the story is 
about the body and all the organisms that live in the body: the i coli bacteria in 
the stomach, the plaque in your teeth, the millions of organisms in the eyebrow 
area—the roots of the eyelashes have particular organisms different from the ones 
32  G. Anzaldúa, Speaking across the Divide, in: The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, p. 293.
33  G. Anzaldúa, Interviews/Entrevistas, ed. A. Keating, New York 2000.
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in the forehead. You are not just AnaLouise, you’re all the different organisms 
and parasites that live on your body and also the ones that live in symbiotic 
relationship to you. The mouth!!! The mouth has tons of bacteria and foreign 
stuff. Animals live in symbiotic relationships—the cows with little birds picking 
the ticks off. So who are you? You’re not a single entity. You’re a multiple entity.34
Although the story’s title seems to describe these organisms as nonhuman 
aliens, Anzaldúa suggests that these “alien” inhabitants transform 
the human host, enhancing the human’s hybridity, expanding the meaning 
and manifestation of human life. In nepantlera subjectivity, identity, being, 
and body are no longer fixed, inert, and single-dimensionally marked 
by rigidly-ascribed organic and ideological boundaries; they are, rather, 
a synergistic collectivity, a communion of unique but interconnected entities. 
Just as the virus and the human create a shifting biological whole that 
transcends the sum of its parts, Anzaldúa blurs the boundaries between 
the I and the Alien, the I and the Other, the I and the We.
We want to underscore the innovative dimensions of Anzaldúa’s 
nepantlera subjectivity. Anzaldúa is not posthuman; she neither denies 
nor discounts human beings and human life. Rather, she occupies 
the category (“human being”) and transforms it from within. Given 
the dehumanisation Anzaldúa and other people of colours have experien- 
ced in U.S. culture–where full human status has been defined as ‘white,’ 
male, able-bodied, economically sufficient, and Christian–this willful 
occupation of the human is itself a significant political act.35 But even 
more significant, for us, is the fact that Anzaldúa does not only insist 
–in the face of racism, sexism, and other forms of relentless dehumani-
sation–on her humanity. She is not content simply to self-define as 
“human.” (Inevitably, to do so, would replicate anthropocentrism’s 
binary framework.) Instead, she redefines what it means to be human 
–drawing on her beliefs, her experiences, and her desire for radically 
inclusionary communities. By insisting on her humanity while redefining 
the very meaning of the term “human,” Anzaldúa enacts an innovative 
34  Ibid., p. 158.
35 As María Lugones notes, “Beginning with the colonization of the Americas 
and the Caribbean, a hierarchical, dichotomous distinction between human and 
non-human was imposed on the colonized in the service of Western man. . . . Indige- 
nous peoples of the Americas and enslaved Africans were classified as not human in 
species—as animals . . . . The European, bourgeois, colonial, modern man became 
a subject/agent, fit for rule, for public life and ruling, a being of civilization, hetero- 
sexual, Christian, a being of mind and reason.” – Toward a Decolonial Feminism, 
„Hypatia” 2010, no. 4, p. 743.
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post-anthropocentric subjectivity that decentres both conventional 
meanings of the human and progressive standpoint epistemologies.
Epistemologically, nepantlera subjectivity leads to a relational form 
of holistic thought-and-action which Anzaldúa names conocimiento. 
The Spanish word for “knowledge” or “consciousness,” conocimiento 
represents a context-specific mix of empirical, rational, analytical, 
imaginal, and intuitive thinking and acting.36 Like feminist standpoint 
epistemologies, conocimiento originates in personal-collective, embodied 
experiences. But Anzaldúa’s theory and practice of conocimiento 
defines “experience” more broadly. Whereas the former associates stand-
point exclusively with human social identity categories, conocimiento’s 
standpoint(s) includes human social identity categories but expands 
beyond them to also to include a more-than-human perspective that 
begins with respect for the nonhuman and openness to all existence. 
Anzaldúa offers her most developed delaboration of conocimiento in 
“now let us shift . . . . the path of conocimiento . . . . inner work, public 
acts,” where she presents a recursive seven-stage process that relies on 
a ceaseless transmutation, a simultaneously inward and outward move-
ment, that makes permeable and then dissolves conventional western 
oppositions (self/non-self, human/nonhuman, spirit/flesh, etc.). As we 
see in the following passage, her perspective–her standpoint, if you 
will–becomes the literal ground on which she metaphorically stands 
—a ground now defined as sacred, “tierra sagrada.” 
You stand on tierra sagrada—nature is alive and conscious; the world is ensouled. 
You lift your head to the sky, to the wingspread of pelicans, the stark green of 
trees, the wind sighing through their branches. You discern faces in the rocks 
and allow them to see you. You become reacquainted with a reality called spirit, 
a presence, force, power, and energy within and without. Spirit infuses all that 
exists—organic and inorganic—transcending the categories and concepts that 
govern your perception of material reality. Spirit speaks through your mouth, 
listens through your ears, sees through your eyes, touches with your hands.37
What does it mean, to view nature as “alive and conscious,” or to “discern 
36 For discussions of Anzaldúa’s theory of conocimiento, see S. OhmerGlo-
ria E. Anzaldúa’s Decolonising Ritual de Conocimiento, „Confluencia” 2010, no. 1, 
p. 141–153; K. Zaytoun, Theorizing at the Borders: Considering Social Location in 
Rethinking Self and Psychological Development, „NWSA Journal” 2006, no.2, p. 52–72.
37  G. Anzaldúa, now let us shift . . . . the path of conocimiento . . . . inner work, 
public acts, in: This bridge we call home: Radical Visions for Transformation, ed. G.E. 
Anzaldúa, A. Keating, New York 2002, p. 540–578.
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faces in the rocks and allow them to see you”? While it could be temp-
ting to dismiss these statements (and, perhaps, the entire passage) 
as hopelessly naive and overly-romanticised, we suggest a different in-
terpretation. Drawing on nagualismo, indigenous thought, and esoteric 
philosophies,38 Anzaldúa posits an animist-inflected ontology, 
an entirely animated world in which everything is alive. To borrow 
Bennett’s vocabulary, we could say that Anzaldúa posits the “vibrant 
materiality” of all existence. The point here is not Anzaldúa’s terms–indeed, 
in her onto-epistemology words like “spirit, a presence, force, power, 
and energy” are interchangeable and almost entirely synonymous. In this 
passage, and elsewhere in her writings, “spirit” becomes another word for 
“flesh” and, like “flesh,” is deeply embodied and partially nonhuman.39 
Anzaldúa posits a “supernatural presence in things” which resembles 
or calls out to the psychic components of our lives.40 To again borrow 
Bennett’s terms, Anzaldúa risks anthropomorphising the nonhuman 
world (attributing so-called human characteristics to aspects of non-
human life) and thus supports Bennett’s speculation near the end of 
Vibrant Matter: 
Maybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing 
(superstition, the divinization of nature, romanticism) because it, oddly enough, 
works against anthropocentrism: a chord is struck between person and thing, 
and I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman “environment.” Too often 
the philosophical rejection of anthropomorphism is bound up with a hubristic 
demand that only humans and God can bear any traces of creative agency. To 
qualify and attenuate this desire is to make it possible to discern a kind of life 
irreducible to the activities of humans or gods. This material vitality is me, 
it predates me, it exceeds me, it postdates me. (120)
These words could be Anzaldúa’s. She, too, invites us to step into 
a larger framework, to take up her connectionist vision, to shift our 
38  For discussions of Anzaldúa’s interest in esoteric philosophies, see R. Conner, 
“Santa Nepantla: A Borderlands Sutra Plenary Speech, in: El Mundo Zurdo: Selected 
Works from the Meetings of the Society for the Study of Gloria Anzaldúa 2007 & 2009, 
ed. N.E. Cantú et. al, San Francisco 2010, p. 177–202; A. Levine, Champion of the 
Spirit: Anzaldúa’s Critique of Rationalist Epistemology, in: EntreMundos/AmongWorlds: 
New Perspectives on Gloria Anzaldúa, ed. A. Keating, New York 2005, p. 171–184.
39  See Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, Aunt Lute 2008, 
p. 93. For a discussion of this aspect of Anzaldúa’s work, see A. Keating, Speculative 
Realism, Visionary Pragmatism, and Poet-Shamanic Aesthetics in Gloria Anzaldúa–
and Beyond, „Women’s Studies Quarterly” 2012, no. 3, p. 51–69.
40  G. Anzaldúa, Llorona, in: The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, p. 297.
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understanding of human life and our definition of the human: 
With awe and wonder you look around, recognizing the preciousness 
of the earth, the sanctity of every human being on the planet, the ultimate unity 
and interdependence of all beings... Love swells in your chest and shoots out 
of your heart chakra, linking you to everyone/everything . . . You share a category 
of identity wider than any social position or racial label.41
We’ve quoted this passage at length to illustrate conocimiento’s 
expansive dimensions–the broad, sweeping vision which starts with 
the embodied human being–a nepantlera with a multiplicitous, permeable 
self-identity, feet planted firmly on tierra sagrada–and flows outward, 
encompassing all that exists. (This nepantlera already exceeds the human 
social identity “boxes.”) Conocimiento entails (and enacts) a shift from 
human social identity categories into a more-than-human standpoint 
that begins with respect for the nonhuman and moves outward. Anzaldúa 
replaces conventional social identity categories, which focus entirely 
on the human, with an open-ended shared identity that includes but 
goes beyond human life.
The differences between conventional feminist standpoint episte-
mology and Anzaldúa’s post-anthropocentric epistemology are striking. 
Whereas feminist standpoint epistemologies emerge from and valorise 
the specific embodied experiences of marginalised peoples, conocimiento 
begins with these embodied experiences but defines them in more 
expansive terms–terms which acknowledge but go beyond the physi-
cally-defined, socially-inscribed human being to include internal and 
external multiplicity. As we suggested above, for Anzaldúa, the human 
body itself exceeds the human (as typically defined). The opening-up 
to the cosmos that she enacts in “now let us shift” points to another 
form that this multiplicity can take–a logical extension, as it were, given 
Anzaldúa’s understanding of each human body as a supra-human 
multiplicitous entity.
While it’s tempting to conclude this article with an oppositional 
stance and step-by-step recommendations for change, we take a more 
speculative approach and invite our readers to consider these questions: 
What can we learn from our microbiomic companions, from our 
abiding biological affiliation with the virus, from Anzaldúa’s nepantlera 
subjectivity and onto-epistemology? How might standpoint epistemo- 
logies and other progressive theories be transformed if we adopt 
41  G. Anzaldúa, now let us shift, ibid., p. 558.
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Anzaldúa’s bold standpoint (on “tierra sangrada”) and her willingness to risk 
the anthropomorphic? In this era of the anthropocene, what might 
happen when feminist standpoint theorists and other progressive scholars 
endorse the shift envisioned by Anzaldúa; alchemise virology’s advances 
into a theory of radical, interspecial reciprocity and inclusion; and 
facilitate humanity’s conocimiento: an awareness that on a macro as well 
as microscopic level there is no such thing as separation, as isolation, 
as action and existence occurring in independence? Might this onto-
epistemology facilitate a transformational, potentially healing process—
for the planet, and for a humanity reunited with a lively, thriving, vibrant 
interconnectivity of entities?42
42  We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments 
on a previous version of this article.
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Tytuł: Decentralizacja człowieka? Ku postantropocentrycznej teorii punktu widzenia
Abstrakt: Bazując na ostatnich postępach w wirusologii oraz pracy queerowej 
feministki chicano Glorii Anzaldúa’y, w niniejszym artykule badamy możliwość 
przesunięcia z pozycji epistemologii antropocentrycznych (w tym feministycznych 
teorii punktu widzenia) w stronę szerszych, zdecentralizowanych sposobów produkcji 
wiedzy - takich, które ani nie byłyby skoncentrowane wyłącznie na człowieku, ani nie 
były w pełni postludzkie. Badamy to przejście w kilku etapach składających się na 
poszczególne części niniejszego artykułu: (1) krótki przegląd współczesnych krytyk 
antropocentryzmu oraz ograniczeń feministycznej teorii punktu widzenia głównego 
nurtu w kontekście przekroczenia antropocentryzmu; (2) analiza współczesnych 
opracowań z obszaru wirusologii, które prezentują obiecujące alternatywy wobec 
wąskiej antropocentrycznej definicji tego, co ludzkie; oraz (3) analiza podmiotowości 
nepantlera i onto-epistemologii Anzaldúa’y na gruncie jej teorii conocimiento. Dzieło 
Glorii Anzaldúa’y dostarcza nam unikalnej perspektywy dla powyższych rozważań, 
gdyż postantropocentryczny (i posthumanistyczny) wymiar myśli Anzaldúa’y nie 
został jeszcze w pełni zbadany, a jej epistemologię powszechnie kategoryzuje się jako 
etnicznie określoną feministyczną teorię punktu widzenia.
Słowa kluczowe: antropocentryzm, feministyczna teoria punktu widzenia, Gloria 
Anzaldúa, postantropocentryzm, wirusologia
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